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There is a growing recognition of the tact that the work of one of the founders of the
socio-cultural approach. Lev Vygotsky, is rooted in the work of his predecessors and
contemporaries and that a proper understanding of his insights must involve a thorough
study of the social and scientific context of his work (cf. Van der Veer and Valsmer,
1991b; 1994). Rather than declaring that Vygotsky was "fifty years ahead of his time'
we should try and understand his work as a unique assimilation and extension of the
different insights and influences which happened to be present at the time. In doing so,
we do not loose sight of Vygotsky as a unique phenomenon, but rather enhance our
understanding of the social and scientific embeddedness of his thinking.
The French psychiatrist Pierre Janet was definitely one of the major contemporary
thinkers who provided Vygotsky with various fundamental ideas to elaborate. But he
was much more than that, of course, and in suggesting that he addressed several basic
questions, which are of fundamental importance for a social-cultural approach, I do not
for one moment wish to suggest that this does justice to Janet's many-sided and
elaborate work. Nor do 1 wish to suggest that there is some sort of linear scientific
progress from Janet to Vygotsky. Of course, we can paraphrase Newton by saying "If
Vygotsky has seen father, it was by standing on the shoulders of giants", but often we
can equally well say that progress was made by treading on other people s toes, by
actively resisting or distorting their ideas. This applies to the complex relation between
Janet's and Vygotsky's ideas as well.
The limited goal of this paper will be to discuss several themes in Janet's work from
the point of view of their relevance for our peculiar, contemporary ideas about a socio-
cultural psychology. I think there is nothing wrong with such an approach, indeed it
seems inevitable, as long as one realizes it dangers.
Having said this, I must confess that some distortion of Janet s views is inevitable in
view of the limited space we have available here. For, as you probably know, Janet s
work covered a period of exactly 60 years of creative insights and as a result I can do
little more than highlight several of his very early studies and then switch to some
themes that were prevalent in his more mature work of the late 1920s and early 1930s.
In doing so I will proceed according to the method well-known to sculptors: I will
simply cut what seems superfluous from a larger body of material (cf. Valsiner and Van
der Veer, in prep.). The dangers of such a procedure are well-known to the reader.
EARLY INSIGHTS
As you may know, Janet (1885, 1886a, 1886b, 1886c, 1886d) began his scientific
career by treating mental patients through hypnosis. He soon hit upon the phenomenon
of "dissociation" ("disdoublement"), that is, the fact that under hypnosis some part of
the subject's personality may claim that it is aware of some event or feeling (say,
experiencing pain), wheteas another part claims the opposite. The personality is
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dissociated into two distinct parts that seem to function more or less independently. The
subject seems unaware of various events, but in reality they are "simply separated from
the ensemble of psychic phenomena of which the synthesis forms the idea of "me"'
(Janet, 1887, p. 471; cf. Hilgard, 1977). Janet's analysis of this early finding was quite
interesting for our purpose.
Firstly, he posited that the hypnotizer was to an extent the co-constructor of the
events that take place. To give an example, it was Janet who suggested to one of his
patients - a certain Léonie - to give a name to one part of her personality and he soon
claimed that the so-called mediums in spiritistic sessions might be persons with a
dissociated mind, who ascribe their feelings to some dead person, as this is what is
socially expected in that situation. The subject is, as it were, experiencing her own
reelings and thoughts in socially accepted ways (cf. Janet, 1892).
Secondly, and related to the first point, Janet claimed that adult personality is an
exceedingly complex construction consisting of different layers and parts. These layers
and parts develop in the continual social interaction with other people. Janet was not at
all inclined to attribute the resulting complex whole to the unfolding of some genetic
factors or to brain maturation, as he saw no point in introducing "physiological
phantasies that have less poetry without having more certitude" (Janet, 1888, p. 278).
Thirdly, Janet assumed that the particularities of these complex constructions were
due to specific events in the life-course of the person and sometimes originate in early
childhood events. The fact that some events are not perceived/accepted by the normal
"me" and relegated to another group of phenomena, or personality, Janet (1886c, 1988)
hypothesized to be due to some traumatic events in childhood. This suggestion
antedates Bowlby's (1974) recent hypothesis that the origin of multiple personality lies
in traumatic experiences in early childhood.
In other words, such socio-cultural features of the human mind as its social,
complex, and developmental nature were, albeit implicitly and in embryonic form,
present in Janet's early writings and it comes as no surprise that in the next decades he
would turn to such thinkers as Baldwin and Royce, who had developed theoretical views
that could strenghten and elaborate his own ideas (cf. Valsiner and Van der Veer, 1988).
MAJOR THEMES IN JANET'S LATER WORK
In the next decades Janet would enormously elaborate, change, and refine his
theoretical views, but the sources of his claims would always remain the same. Elaborate
analyses of the phenomena displayed by the adult mental patients he treated provided a
firm foundation for most of the claims he made (as we have seen above), but in addition
to that he had a thorough knowledge of his contemporary scientific literature, and,
finally, did not shy away from bold, and ar times bizarre, speculation (cf. Van der Veer
and Valsiner, 1991a).
Relying on these three sources Janet arrived at three, interrelated claims about the
origin, development, and nature of human mental functioning. The first claim was that
all private mental actions bave a social origin. The nature of adult human memory was
Janet's favorite example to illustrate this claim. He had observed that patients invariably
adapted their account of past events to the person of the listener. Such accounts are
socially shared events and the speaker attempts to fit his reminiscences into a story that
will be intelligible to the listener. In doing so he or she (reconstructs his or her
memory as do the reactions and questions of the listener. The retrieval and expression of
memorized events, then, is a social event that consequently modifies its content.
Moreover, in Janets opinion the storage and encoding of events are social processes as
207
well. We experience certain events that we immediately try to fit into existing
categories and stories that will make sense to another person when related. In doing so
we make these events intelligible to ourselves as well. This illustrates one of Janet's
(1928, p. 22) fundamental laws, which says that "All social conducts performed vis-_-
vis others have their private repercussions. All things we do vis-à-vis others, we do them
vis-_-vis ourselves; we treat ourselves as another". It is interesting that in this context
Janet speaks of private repercussions, that is, the construction of the self seems to follow
the social, interpersonal interactions. In other places in his works it seems to be implied
that the construction of the self and the growth of interpersonal relations proceed
simultaneously and that the personal and the social self are two sides of the same coin
(cf. Valsiner and Van der Veer, in prep.).
Generalizing, we might say that for the later Janet all seemingly private
psychological functions, such as language and thought, are originally and essentially
social. They evolved out of the need to communicate with others. This illustrates once
again Janet's (1929, p. 521) fundamental claim, made well-known by Vygotsky, that all
higher, typically human, mental processes have a social origin: they first exist between
people as social, interpsychological actions and only afterwards become transformed into
private, intrapsychological processes.
The example of human memory can also serve to illustrate Janet's second
fundamental claim. It was that all higher mental processes are the result of a long ana complex
development. Janet considered both the phylogenetic and the ontogenetic domain. In this
context he claimed that animal memory is totally different from adult human memory.
It is inflexible, not adaptable to varying circumstances and based on association. Janet
(1928, pp. 213/223; 1936, pp. 159-169) coined this type of memory "restutio ad
integrum", meaning that one stimulus triggers the other, associated stimuli, which
leads to the restorement of the integral whole.
Janet speculated that the first human type of memory rested on the enacting of the
experienced event, but that with the onset and development of language different levels
of verbal encoding developed, such as simple description, narration, and, finally, what he
called fabulation. What we call memory is an exceedingly complex whole of different
intellectual operations, which partly exist side by side and partly become superimposed
upon each other. Modern children only gradually master the whole set of these
culturally-based mnemonic operations. Incidentally, it is only natural that proceeding
from these assumptions Janet (1928, pp. 260-262) was quite critical of the existing
memory research with its heavy emphasis on non-intelligent mnemonic operations (e.g.
repetition) and its meaningless material (e.g. nonsense syllables). At the background of
his critical attitude was also the more general conviction that man is a story-telling
animal and that human memory is primarily based on the telling of a story ("r_cit") to
oneself and others. As it takes time to master such habits and as men are much superior
to animals it can be said that adult higher memory processes, and mental processes at
large, are the result of a complex phylogenetic and ontogenetic development.
Put in this way Janet's third basic claim almost seems to follow automatically. It said
that the higher mental processes do not exist immutably in a special, spiritual domain, so to
speak, but an intimately tied to the actions the subject performs. Janet claimed that to an
extent human behavior can be explained by reference to external stimulation and that
human actions can be understood as reactions to environmental stimuli. This reasoning
would seem to bring Janet quite close to behaviorism. But in fact, Janet was quite
critical of behaviorism, which in his view neglected a most importantant second source
of stimulation: human language and the knowledge embodied in it. It is language and
culture which transform the original (bodily) actions. The most primitive form of
human preverbal memory - to come back to our earlier example - Janet posited to be
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based upon material objects. Janet mentioned the use of such material mnemonic
devices as the knot in the handkerchief and the buying of souvenirs by tourists. He
hypothesized that with the advent of language such type of material memory aids lost
much of their prevalence to the verbal aids we discussed before. Nevertheless,
memorization remains an active process of (re-Construction or, in short, an action and
such actions often originally rely upon the use of material means and bodily movements.
CONCLUSION
These few and cursory remarks must suffice to give an impression of the potential
value of Janet's ideas for a socio-cultural account of mind. All of his themes, the social,
developmental, and action-based nature of higher human mental functioning seem
relevant for a future socio-cultural theory and such diverse thinkers as Wallon (Netchine-
Grynberg, this volume), Leont'ev and Vygotsky assimilated different aspects of his work.
In his turn, Janet himself was in great debt to the major thinkers of his time, such as
Bergson, Lèvy-Bruhl, Royce, and Baldwin (cf. Valsiner and Van der Veer, in prep.).
All this does not imply, of course, that Janet's theorizing was unproblematic and
neither do I wish to suggest that Janet anticipated all of Vygotsky's most seminal ideas.
One of Janet s ideas that most modern researchers would find unacceptable, for example,
is the idea that present-day non-Western civilizations can tell us much about our own
past as these civilizations did not develop any further whereas we did. For Janet and
many of his contemporaries this was still a rather unproblematic claim and he
consequently freely called non-Western people the "living documents" of the Western
past when he speculated about the historical origin of cultural practices. The idea that
Janet anticipated all of Vygotsky's ideas is likewise untenable. Vygotsky and other co-
constructors of a socio-cultural view made ample use of Janet's notions and speculations,
but put them to their own use, combining them with ideas of other researchers and
synthesizing all ideas into a new integral whole. The matter of scientific influence is a
complex one (cf. Van der Veer and Valsiner, 1988) and here I will just remark that while
a comparison of Vygotsky's and Janets views does justice to neither of them - as both
held views that cannot be dealt with in the limited context of such a comparison - it is
very instructive to see how Janet coming from a very different background made very
valuable contributions to a socio-cultural theory of mind. It is by combining the
contributions of different major thinkers and critically reviewing them that a future
socio-cultural theory should be constructed.
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LA RELEVANCIA DE PIERRE JANET PARA UNA APROXIMACJON SOCIO-
CULTURAL. Resumen en castellano
El psiquiatra Frances Pierre Janet fue uno de los pensadores que mäs contnbuyó a
inspirar el pensamiento de Lev Vygotsky y la teori'a sociocultural de la psique. Sus ideas
de que a) codas las acciones mentales privadas tienen un origen social, b) todas las
nanciones mentales superiores son el resultado de un desarroUo prolongado e intrincado,
y c) que las funciones mentales superiores resultan de acciones concretas son muy
importante para una aproximación socio-cultural. En este arti'culo se demuestra que ya
en los textos psicoterapéuticos clasicos de Janet se puede hallar el germen de estas jdeas.
Basandose sobre su trabajo terapéutico, su conocimiento de Ia literatura cient/fica de su
tiempo, y en especulaciones arriesgadas Janet formulaba principios que son importantes
para las variantes contemporaneas de una teon'a socio-cultural de Ia psique. Se
argumenta que tal teona se puede construir en parte usando versiones extendidas y
enmendadas de las ideas fructfferas de Janet, Baldwin, Royce, Vygotsky y otros gigantes
de la disciplina.
